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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

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1. It should be understood that all preparations for war are to be conducted under conditions of complete secrecy as far as the people are concerned. Nevertheless, if preparations for war were actually underway, they are bound to be evident to the populace. How will such preparations be in evidence?
- (a) In the first place, there will be changeover on the part of some of the industries from peace-time to war-time production.
 - (b) Some of the building construction projects will be curtailed or suspended.
 - (c) There will be a curtailment of certain types of civilian goods.
 - (d) There will be rationing or a reduction in rations, primarily of fuels, and in the limitation of use of automotive vehicles.
 - (e) There will be a concentration or delivery of certain types of supplies for the army to designated areas.
 - (f) Construction will be carried out on certain roads.
 - (g) Hangars and airstrips will be constructed.
 - (h) Certain communications lines will be built up.
2. Prices of certain consumer items will be increased; this increase will be rather slight, to be sure, in order not to disrupt civilian morale. It goes without saying that the morale has to be given a boost just prior to a war. In fact, people will be extended certain indulgences, that is, rest homes will be made available to the people, as will certain sanitariums. In addition, free travel will be made available. etc.

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3. The political preparation of the people will consist in the issuance of booklets with propaganda information regarding those countries against whom the war is to be waged. Everything possible of a discreditable nature will be contained in these booklets in order to rouse the antipathy of the peoples against the enemy. Numerous lectures, speeches, and conferences will be given; these will be conducted long prior to the outbreak of the war. These various measures will not be readily discernable, but if one carefully analyzes conditions they can be detected. During this period the press will be unusually active. Its attitude to the countries concerned and the course of international relations will be radically changed. All the foregoing measures will be apparent to all people of the Soviet Union.
4. The situation with regard to the army will be slightly different. The reason for that is the fact that the army maintains itself in a condition of constant combat readiness. It goes without saying that the matter of making preparations for war and resolving all problems pertaining to war is the function solely of the government. Hence, it is essential that we have a practical picture of the Soviet Army as a whole.
5. All armed forces units have a plan of operations which is put into effect in the event of war. Such a document is held in the utmost secrecy and is put into action after war has been declared. It is impossible for anyone to know whether the army is making actual preparations for war. I have in mind, of course, secret preparations for war. The only thing that will be evident will be the fact that the army is being concentrated in areas in which it had not previously been stationed. In 1941, for example, railroad troop transports moved westward day and night -- everyone noticed that -- even though war had not been declared on Germany. It was clear to everyone that the armed forces were moving westward to carry out some sort of military maneuvers. However, no one had any idea of the existing plans or of the schedule which the army was going to follow. Everyone knew who the enemy was at that time. If the Soviet forces were to move westward again, the identity of the enemy forces would be clear to everyone. Hence, your ordinary citizen, or some traveler through a given area would hardly notice any open preparations for war, to say nothing of some given details with respect to this matter.
6. In order to know anything about the comparative size of the personnel force of various military groups and any increase in the amount of their equipment, it is first necessary to know something of the conditions under which the given military force exists at a given time, that is, whether it is under peacetime or wartime strength. Even though there will be an augmentation from peacetime to wartime strength, such a change will hardly be noticeable. There is no such thing as the gradual arrival of personnel to armed forces units since the men arrive only when replacements are called up. As far as the arrival of personnel at other than such a period, that situation occurs only when the unit is reorganized or when it is being distributed.
7. All armed forces personnel, and the army as a whole, are always prepared to execute combat missions. The practical activities of all troops consist in combat and political training. In connection with these, there are the so-called alerts -- phases of training in which the men are trained. Each unit commander has and should exercise his authority to carry out both training and actual combat alerts. Such alerts are all carried out by the appropriate staffs and their results are issued in the form of an official directive following their execution. All staffs of the various units have a plan of operation for their particular units with regard to the proclamation of a state of alert. All this has to do with the peacetime training of the forces in the Soviet Army. Hence, it is a mandatory training measure. Thus it is difficult to know the purpose of a given activity of an armed group -- it is difficult to know whether they are making preparations for war. The reason for this, as I have said, is that alerts are a daily training feature of the troops.
8. The question of mobilizing the army is the direct function of the government, that is, it determines the size of the country's army. All citizens of the USSR are subject to the draft in accordance with federal laws. Mobilization of draftees is carried out annually -- the first post-war peacetime draft took place in 1949. This mobilization occurred during the months of April and May of that year.

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year. Thus, if the government calls up only that age group which is subject to compulsory military training it is simply exercising an ordinary measure. If, however, the government calls up a greater or broader age bracket for military training, it means that the army as a whole is being built up. Although age brackets are set up governing the drafting of personnel into the armed forces, there are certain individuals who are exempted from this law. They consist of persons who have been either temporarily or permanently exempted from the draft.

9. Who are the people who enjoy the right of exemption? They consist of war industries workers, students, party members, and others. How can we detect whether mobilization is being carried out during peacetime? Actually not at all. Each person who is eligible for the draft knows that he will be called up some time in advance. Peacetime induction into the armed forces — prior to the war with Germany — was always held in the spring and fall. Since 1945, the first draft call was approximately in the months of May or April, in 1949. I don't know what the policy of the Soviet Government has been with regard to the draft since 1950.
10. The calling up of men in age brackets of wider distribution than that specified by law is likewise the sole authority of the government. However, the people talk about the possibilities that this or that age bracket will be called up long before it actually happens. In my opinion, there is more discussion of war and the probability of war among the people of the USSR than anywhere else. Such discussion began literally on the day the last war ended. The gist of their discussions boiled down to the fact that America was making preparations for war against the USSR. This belief became more widespread as time went on — it was particularly strong during 1948-49. In the early part of 1949 there was an open announcement in the armed forces to the effect that "We are making preparations for a war against America, France, and England" — that "this war is inevitable and will be the last war fought."
11. Knowing this problem quite well as it existed in the USSR, I should like to point out certain of its peculiarities. Prior to 1948, some of the leading figures in Soviet life confidently expected that the United States would launch an attack against the Soviet Union. However, since 1948, the situation has changed considerably. These same persons are now shouting, as they never shouted before, that the Americans are too late with their war now. How is this change of attitude to be explained?
12. Although I wouldn't want to state that my feeling in the matter is the prevalent official belief, I do believe, however, that the change was occasioned by the fact that the government has made certain adequate preparations for war. Furthermore, the situation in China has had some influence on this attitude. Most of all, however, the result of successfully coping with the problem of atomic energy has had a decided effect on this change of attitude. The proportion of forces of the USSR and the United States has become the same, so to speak. I don't know what this concurrence of relative strengths may be, but I only say that the belief was current and the situation was analyzed with this as a basis. Another interesting fact in all this talk of war is that the people did not desire war at that particular time — in fact they feared war as they never feared it before. This is quite understandable in view of the many reminders of the past war.
13. In order to convince the people of the inevitability of the forthcoming war, the government tried to sell the public the idea that "It is not the Soviet Union which is seeking war — that we had nothing to do with it." They did this to show the populace that war was inescapable, that the people must take part in the war, and the war was bound to come. Can the people of Russia really know who is making preparations for war at the present time? We can safely reply that they know nothing about what is going on.
14. The following is an interesting sidelight concerning the morals of the people of the USSR. Whereas they formerly did not want war and greatly feared another war, this feeling has undergone considerable change of late, — such fears have been greatly diminished now. This is explained by the fact that the government has made an official announcement to the effect that it has successfully resolved the problem of atomic energy. In the past many of the thinking men of the USSR racked their brain to develop some conception of the relation of forces between the Soviets and the United States. They weighed all factors which would affect the outcome of a future

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war between the two nations and came to the conclusion each time that the main fears which they entertained of the United States was the fact that the latter nation possessed the atomic bomb. Now, the USSR too, has the bomb.

15. If the army were actually to be expanded or mobilized it would be done somewhat as follows. In the Soviet Army there is a rule which reads that in case of war, all small and large units would be expanded to three times their peacetime or pre-war strength. For example, the company would be expanded into a battalion; the battalion into a regiment; the regiment into a division; the division into a corps; the corps into an army. As far as those elements which are located outside of the national boundaries of the USSR are concerned, the forces of occupation in Germany could be expanded into an army group. The Central Army Group elements in Austria could be developed into an army. I make my statement on the basis of the size forces which are contained in both Austria and Germany. This triple expansion of the size of units is in accordance with peacetime regulations in the Soviet Army. Whether there will be any need for this, and whether the Soviet Union will be able to triple expansion under war conditions can only be determined by the size of the available reserve force and the combat situation.
16. Thus, if we consider the present situation in which there are almost 3 million men under arms, the question arises whether the USSR can expand its armed forces to 9 million men. Yes indeed, it can raise the number to 9 million immediately, and eventually can increase the total to between 18 and 20 million. I say to the latter figure on the basis of the population count. Whether this can be practicable, is again, another question. On the basis of the last war I can state that the Soviet armed forces were equal to almost 18 million men.
17. Long before the advent of actual war there should be considerable troop movement along the railroads. This movement will be the more evident immediately prior to the war. By way of example, I might mention that troop transports moved day and night before the outbreak of the war with Germany. An infantry division requires approximately 20-21 troop trains to effect its movement. The troop train ordinarily consists of between 48 and 60 cars (two and four axled cars).
18. Preparation for any kind of offensive movement can be observed only when direct preparations for war are being made. Such preparations will include literally all questions such as: reconversion of the industries for war, movement of troops into the border area, preparation of reserve supplies, calling up men into the armed forces, etc. However, from the official standpoint mobilization is in effect the instant the government declares that a state of war exists with some country.
19. Bear in mind that if actual preparations were being made for war, these activities will be evident to everyone. If the Soviet government were making actual preparations for war -- regardless of on whom -- it would be necessary for her to bring up between 150 and 200 divisions to some particular border area. I now ask, wouldn't the presence of so many troops in any given area certainly be noticeable? Of course it will; there can be no doubt about it. When I speak of the movement of such large bodies of troops, I have in mind the period before the very outset of the war.
20. In my opinion a war cannot be started with what troops are available at the present time. However, there is every possibility of incidents occurring which might precipitate a war.
21. Troops of the Soviet Army are moved very frequently over the railroads in Austria and, I think, through Germany. What is the significance of such moves? First of all, it depends on the district in which such moves are taking place. If they take place in the vicinity of the area of distribution of certain large units in that particular territory, it means that they are part of the tactical training exercises of those forces. If the movement is directly to the westward from the USSR, that is, into Germany or into Austria, it means that troop concentrations in these countries are being increased by a considerable amount.
22. I don't even entertain the idea that those authorities concerned with the question of ordinary movement of troops by rail, especially within Austria, would have as their object leading the appropriate military officials of the United States, British, and French Armies -- armies which are likewise located in Germany and Austria -- astray as to their intentions.

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23. On the contrary, experience has shown that the Russian High Command has always camouflaged the movement of its troops insofar as it has been possible. That is to say, conditions permitting, the troops were always moved during the night. Furthermore, from the fact of the location of their troops in Austrian territory, we can conclude that they can be moved about in various directions, literally, from the eastern boundary, Brucke, to the western boundary at Linz (I am referring to the Urfahr district). They will still be troops which are being distributed in Austrian territory.
24. How great will this movement be from the standpoint of total troop trains involved? I have already mentioned that between 21 and 22 troop trains are required to move an entire division. This means that one troop train is required to move each rifle battalion or artillery battalion. Thus, during the course of the training year each rifle or artillery battalion will be moved by rail in pursuance of its tactical exercises. This very situation was pertinent to the troops located in Austria.
25. On the other hand, we must draw entirely different inferences with regard to the movement of troops from the east of Bruck, that is, troops coming in from Hungary. There were instances in the past, however, wherein troops of the 17th Mechanized Division (located in Hungary) came to Austria for the purpose of conducting joint exercises with the forces located in Austria. Such incidents, however, were of rare occurrence and took place during the fall only, at the time of the exercises conducted for the inspecting bodies. I have in mind exercises on the scale of the Central Army Group.
26. The situation with regard to the movement of troops by rail within the boundaries of the USSR is quite different. There, troops are moved by rail only when they are moved to the areas where the summer training camps are located. Such movements take place in the early part of May each year; the troops return to winter quarters in October, after completing exercises for the inspecting body. It is understood, of course, that not every area within the USSR lends itself for the carrying out of a given military problem. In the winter period they occupy their winter quarters and make use of the area in that vicinity. In the summer, they leave for the summer camps and make use of the locality set aside for their needs. The area set aside for summer training is of a permanent nature and is equipped as much as necessary.

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